Beyond NIN-SIM: Why digital identity alone cannot solve Nigeria’s kidnapping crisis

By Nonye Ngoka

When Nigeria launched the mandatory National Identification Number (NIN)-SIM linkage in 2020, the initiative was promoted as a critical step towards strengthening national security. By tying every active SIM card to a verified identity, the expectation was that anonymous communications would become increasingly difficult, making it easier for security agencies to investigate criminal activities.

Nearly six years later, however, kidnapping for ransom and terrorist attacks remain a major security concern, prompting fresh questions about the role of the country’s digital identity infrastructure in tackling crime.

The debate resurfaced after the Director-General of the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), Abisoye Coker-Odusote, explained during an interview on Channels Television’s Sunday Politics that kidnappers often evade identification by using mobile phones belonging to their victims instead of their own registered SIM cards.

According to her, subscriber records naturally point investigators to the legitimate owner of the SIM, not necessarily the person making the ransom call. She also suggested that some criminal elements involved in kidnapping operations may not even be enrolled in Nigeria’s identity database if they are brought into the country solely for criminal missions.

The comments have renewed public debate over whether expectations surrounding the NIN-SIM linkage have outpaced the capabilities of the technology itself.

Identity verification was the primary objective

The NIN-SIM linkage was introduced by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) in collaboration with NIMC to strengthen subscriber identity management, eliminate anonymous SIM ownership and improve the integrity of Nigeria’s telecommunications database.

Over the years, millions of subscribers linked their SIM cards to their National Identification Numbers, while telecom operators disconnected millions of non-compliant lines in line with regulatory directives.

The NCC consistently maintained that the initiative was intended to improve identity verification, support national security and strengthen the country’s digital economy by ensuring that every active mobile line could be traced to a verified identity.

Telecom operators’ role ends at subscriber verification

For telecom operators, however, implementing the NIN-SIM policy has always been different from conducting criminal investigations.

Chairman of the Association of Licensed Telecommunications Operators of Nigeria (ALTON), Gbenga Adebayo, has repeatedly explained that operators implement regulatory directives by capturing subscribers’ information and validating it through the NIMC platform.

According to him, telecom companies rely on NIMC to authenticate National Identification Numbers before activating or restoring subscriber lines. Their responsibility is to maintain accurate subscriber records in compliance with NCC regulations, while criminal investigations remain the responsibility of security and law enforcement agencies.

That distinction has become increasingly important as public expectations of the policy continue to evolve.

Experts call for realistic expectations

Telecommunications lawyer and regulatory expert Rotimi Akapo believes much of the public debate stems from a misunderstanding of what the NIN-SIM linkage was designed to achieve.

According to him, the policy primarily addresses identity verification by ensuring that every SIM card is linked to a verifiable individual.

“NIN-SIM linkage solves an identity problem, not a crime problem,” Akapo said, noting that determined criminals can still exploit identity theft, fraudulently registered SIM cards, proxy registrations and other loopholes if intelligence gathering and law enforcement systems are unable to effectively utilise available data.

His remarks reinforce the argument that digital identity should be viewed as one component of a broader national security ecosystem rather than a standalone crime-fighting solution.

The World Bank’s perspective

The World Bank-supported Identification for Development (ID4D) programme describes foundational digital identity as infrastructure that enables individuals to securely prove who they are when accessing both public and private sector services.

In Nigeria, the NIN now supports identity verification across banking, telecommunications, passport applications, taxation, healthcare, education, social intervention programmes and numerous government services.

Security is therefore one of several intended applications of the country’s digital identity ecosystem rather than its sole purpose.

Where the real challenge lies

The latest debate highlights the difference between identity management and operational security.

A verified SIM registration database can establish the legitimate owner of a mobile line, but it cannot independently determine who is physically using the device during a criminal operation. If kidnappers use the phones of their victims, investigators must rely on additional intelligence, telecommunications analysis, digital forensics and coordinated security operations to identify and apprehend the perpetrators.

Similarly, where criminal networks involve individuals outside Nigeria’s digital identity database, effective border management, immigration intelligence and inter-agency collaboration become equally important.

Building a smarter security architecture

Nigeria continues to expand its digital identity ecosystem under the World Bank-supported ID4D programme while accelerating enrolment into the national identity database.

Recent initiatives include broader biometric verification, improved interoperability across government agencies and stronger authentication mechanisms for public services.

As the country’s digital public infrastructure matures, the focus is gradually shifting from identity enrolment to the effective use of identity data across sectors.

The NIN-SIM linkage has undoubtedly strengthened subscriber identity verification and reduced anonymous SIM ownership. However, its long-term contribution to national security will depend on how effectively identity data is integrated with telecommunications intelligence, digital forensics and coordinated law enforcement operations.

The latest debate suggests that Nigeria’s challenge is no longer simply building a digital identity database—it is ensuring that the wider security ecosystem can fully harness the value of the information that database provides.